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Abstract - The purpose of this paper is to analyse farm 
growth and exit and its interaction in Dutch dairy 
farming as consequences of the 2003 CAP reform and 
2008 CAP Health Check. Results indicate that the 
decision to exit dairy farming is largely determined by 
household characteristics as age and the size of the 
household. Farm growth is strongly influenced by the 
availability of labour, capital and land. Simulation 
results show that the dairy policy reforms reduce farm 
growth and exit. This is mainly caused by the quota 
increases.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Production growth is for farms a perquisite for long 
term survival because it enables them to cope with real 
price and income decreases [1]. However, there are 
limits to growth potentials. These limits can e.g. come 
from endowments of labour and land. Another factor 
that potentially limits growth is the presence of a quota 
system. With tradable and binding quotas a farm can 
only grow if another farm sells quotas, e.g. because it 
exits. Exit in turn can be influenced by growth since 
growth can lead to high quota prices facilitating exit. 
Both exit and farm growth result from the behaviour 
of individual farmers. Besides factors affecting 
(future) income from farming, e.g. input and output 
prices, household characteristics and preferences play 
a role. Policy also affects exit and farm growth. For 
example, the 2003 CAP reform and the 2008 CAP 
Health Check1 result in lower farm income leading to 
the decision to stop production. However, some 
farmers might decide to grow to ensure continuity. 
Although research has been done on farm growth and 
on farm exit no research analyses both in combination. 
 Dutch dairy farming is a sector where quotas are 
tradable and binding. The number of dairy farms is 
decreasing and the average size increasing. 
Quantifying the effects on exit and farm growth as a 
                                                          
1
 In 2008 there will be the so-called Health Check, an 
assessment of the 2003 CAP reform, that could lead to 
further EU policy reform (see e.g. [2]). 
result of policy changes has not been taken into 
account in previous micro-economic research on 
Dutch dairy farming. Kimhi and Bollman [3] look at 
exit of farms in Canada and Israel but they do not look 
at farm growth. Weiss [4] does formulate a growth 
model for individual farms but not exit.    
 In the literature exit is modelled as a short term 
change (see e.g. [5]), i.e. exit is defined as not 
observing production in the present year given the 
information in the previous year. Exit, however, is a 
large disinvestment that can take some time. 
Therefore, a decision to exit can lead to an actual exit 
only after a few years. The exit decision is however 
still taken given the available information at the time 
the decision is made.  
 The purpose of this paper is to analyse farm growth 
and exit and its interaction in Dutch dairy farming as 
consequences of the 2003 CAP reform and 2008 CAP 
Health Check. Exit is defined as stopping dairy 
farming. Farm growth is defined as the change in 
quota amounts (a reduction being negative growth). 
 In this research we only look at the growth and exit 
of specialised dairy farms. In 1999/00, the last year of 
the main data set in this research, these farms owned 
94.8 per cent of total milk producing cows and 
represent 87.8 per cent of all farms producing milk. 
 Section 2 presents the empirical model and its 
estimation. Section 3 describes the data used in 
estimation. Section 4 presents the estimation results. 
The possible effects of the dairy policy reforms are 
discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
II. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION 
A. Exit 
We assume exit takes place within three years after the 
decision to exit is taken. Exit is not immediate since it 
involves costs to realise. Therefore, not observing 
production in year t+3 is explained by information of 
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  (1) 
where γ  is a parameter vector to be estimated and itυ  
is an error term with a standard normal distribution 
conditional on itw  and 11, =−tis . This means that 
3, +tis  selects the farms that do not produce milk at 
time t+3 out of the group of farms that are producing 
milk at time t-1.  
 
 The set of explanatory variables in the selection 
equation ( 1, −tiw ) contains the number of household 
members, age, age squared, the milk price index, the 
price index of milk quota, the price index for other 
outputs, the dairy cattle price index, the index for 
wages in the agricultural sector, on-farm labour, a 
discrete variable indicating the level of education of 
the farm manager, the number of hectares, a dummy 
indicating whether a farm earns off-farm labour 
income, a dummy indicating whether a farm has 
sheep, a dummy indicating whether a farm has pigs, a 
dummy indicating whether a farm grows crops and a 
dummy indicating whether a farm keeps cattle for 
meat. The dummies for the activities of farms next to 
milk production are chosen such that at least 15 per 
cent of all farms in the data set perform the activity. 
The price and income variables are divided by the 
price index of a composite of variable inputs to impose 
homogeneity of degree zero in these variables. 
 We assume that exogeneity assumptions hold for 
the explanatory variables. Because we use lagged 
values of the variables we cannot test for this. As a 
consequence we estimate  the exit model by a cross-
section probit estimation procedure [6]. 
B. Growth 
In theory growth depends on the factors that influence 
farm profit and other income. All these elements are 
used as explanatory variables in the empirical 
equation: 
itiittiit cyy εα +++= − θx '1,     (2) 
where ity  is the size of farm i at time t, itx  is a vector 
of explanatory variables, ic  is an unknown  farm 
specific effect, itε  is an error term and α  and θ  are 
parameters to be estimated.  
 For ity  we use milk quota in kilograms 
representing the size of the dairy operation, not the 
size of the whole farm. Subtracting 1, −tiy  from both 
sides of (2) gives the  structural growth equation:  
itittiit yy εα ∆+∆+∆=∆ − θx '1,   (3) 
where ∆  is the first difference operator. 
 The vector of explanatory variables includes land, 
buildings, machinery, labour, farm price indices (of 
quota, other output and cattle), off-farm labour income 
and external non-labour income. The decision to grow 
in milk production is made together with choices on 
the amount of factor inputs and off-farm incomes. So, 
all these variables might be endogenous in the 
structural growth equation.  
 The growth equation is a dynamic panel data model. 
To estimate this equation we use the dynamic panel 
data estimation technique of Arellano and Bond [7] for 
a model with possibly endogenous variables.  
 First differencing of (2) eliminates the farm specific 
effects ic . Unfortunately, the first differencing also 
eliminates the time-invariant variables in the model 
like number of household members and education.  
C. Quota market 
Total milk production of the farms that continue 
should be smaller or equal to the national quota: 
( )1I it it t
i
s y y− ≤∑      (4) 
where I total number of farms, ty national quota at 
time t. 
III. DATA 
The main data set used is rotating panel data set that 
contains annual observations of a large number of 
variables for a sample of Dutch dairy farms. It is not 
possible to determine whether a farm leaves the set 
based on statistical reasons or because of exit from 
milk production. For this we use another data set 
containing annual information on all farms in the 
Netherlands. This data set contains limited information 
but it does contain the number of dairy cows. With this 
variable we can establish whether a farm that leaves 
the rotating panel data set exits milk production. A 
negative growth could imply that a dairy farm is no 
longer considered to be specialised. However, we do 
not take that into account. 
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 A farm is classified to be a specialised dairy farm if 
the size of the dairy part of the farm is more than 50 
per cent of the total size using the Dutch size unit2. 
The rotating panel data set containing Dutch 
specialised dairy farms consists of 6338 observations 
on 1307 farms. The period investigated is from 
1987/88 until 1999/00.  
 Appendix A provides an overview of the variables, 
their units, mean and standard deviation. 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
A. Exit 
Table 1 gives the estimation results of the model 
explaining medium term exit from milk production 
(equation 1). The number of household members has a 
negative effect on the probability to exit. This reflects 
the availability of a successor or at least labour force 
in the future. Age has a positive effect up to 59 years 
and a negative effect afterwards. This confirms the 
expectation that the exit probability of older farmers is 
larger. If the quota price increases (decreases) the 
probability to exit decreases (increases). A higher 
(lower) quota price is positively correlated to farm 
income, and therefore decreases (increases) the exit 
probability. On the other hand high quota prices could 
make it attractive to exit because of the high return in 
case of selling the quotas. The insignificant parameter 
for the quota price means that we can not conclude 
that one of these two effects is stronger, although the 
negative sign indicates the first effect is more 
important. An increase in other output price can 
decrease the probability of exit because of the positive 
effect on income. On the other hand the relative 
increase of other output price compared to the milk 
price can make the farm decide to focus on this other 
output, and exit from milk production. The 
insignificant parameter for the other output price 
means that we can not conclude that one of these two 
effects is stronger. If cattle is seen as an input for milk 
production, the positive effect of the cattle price on the 
probability to exit seems counterintuitive at first, since 
a higher cattle price decreases income from milk 
production in this case. However, cattle is also an 
output for dairy farms. Cattle as output makes the 
positive sign plausible. Having off-farm non-labour 
income has no effect on exit. On one hand one would 
                                                          
2
 This variable is the nge, a value added based unit of output  
(CBS/LEI, 2006) [8]. 
expect that having off-farm non-labour income would 
enable to exit because another source of income is 
available. On the other hand having off-farm non-
labour income gives a source of income that enables to 
continue milk prodcution even if on-farm income is 
low. On-farm labour has a negative effect on the 
probability to exit milk production. High on-farm 
labour reflects either lack of off-farm labour 
opportunities or relatively high on-farm labour return. 
Both result in less exit. The level of education has a 
negative effect but insignificant effect on the 
probability to exit. More education could lead to larger 
off-farm labour opportunities (increasing exit) but also 
to a more profitable dairy operation (decreasing exit). 
The size of a farm expressed in land has a negative 
effect on the exit probability. This could indicate scale 
effects in the earning capabilities in milk production. 
The dummies for off-farm labour income and other 
farm activities are included to see whether the 
probability to exit from milk production is influenced 
by the presence of income from other activities. There 
are two possible ways of reasoning. The first is that 
having an income source next to income from milk 
production spreads the risk for the total household 
income. This means that a farm can level off 
occasional bad results from milk production with the 
other income sources. This process makes exit from 
milk production less likely. The second reasoning is 
that if a farm already has an income source next to 
income from milk production, it is easier to 
completely switch to that other income source. Based 
on this reasoning, having another income source, 
increases the probability to exit milk production. Only 
the dummy for keeping pigs is significantly different 
from zero. It has a negative value indicating that for 
pig production the risk spreading reasoning above is 
more likely. 
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Table 1  Probit estimation results for exit from milk 
production 




Number of household members -0.04 -1.15 
Age 0.13 2.24** 
Age squared/100 -0.11 -1.95** 
Index price milk quota -0.77 -0.90 
Other output price index 1.17 0.79 
Cattle price index -5.45 -1.88** 
Off-farm wage index 0.53 0.60 
External non-labour income in 
100.000 Euro  
0.00 0.40 
On-farm labour in 1000 hours -0.16 -2.50** 
Education level -0.05 -0.43 
Land in hectares -0.02 -3.12** 
Off-farm labour income dummy -0.07 -0.58 
Sheep dummy -0.08 -0.52 
Pig dummy -0.27 -1.64* 
Crops dummy 0.03 0.24 
Meat cattle dummy -0.08 -0.60 
Constant 1.22 0.36 
*(**) significance at 10 per cent (5 per cent) significance level. 
 
B. Growth 
Table 2 gives the estimation results of the growth 
equation (3). The parameter for lagged quota values 
1.05 with t-ratio 11.03. However, to interpret the 
model as a growth model one should subtract lagged 
quota (or 1, −tiy  in terms of equation (3)) from both 
sides of the equation. In this case 1.05–1=0.05 is the 
effect of the quota ( 1, −tiy ) on the growth of quota 
( 1, −− tiit yy ). The positive sign suggests that relatively 
large farms grow faster than smaller farms, however 
the t-ratio for this number is only 0.53. This leads to 
the conclusion that there is no evidence for the 
dependence of growth on the level of milk quota. 
 Relatively large amounts of land, buildings and 
labour have a positive effect on growth in quota. Large 
amounts of these factor input make it easier to 
incorporate the extra quota in the farming process. 
 Other output price has a positive effect on growth in 
quota. This is a counterintuitive result, since it is 
expected that if the returns to other output increase 
more production factors are allocated to other output 
at the expense of milk production. A possible reason 
for this result is that dairy farms use the extra income 
to increase their core activity, which is milk 
production. The positive effect of the quota price on 
growth could be counterintuitive. A quota price 
increase is expected to decrease the demand for quota. 
However, acquiring quota is an investment that has an 
earning capacity that is reflected in the quota price. In 
this way the quota price reflects the profitability of 
milk production, which makes the positive effect of 
quota price on growth plausible. Next to that, farms 
might see quota partly as a speculative asset. When 
prices go up they are building up expectations and 
might be more willing to extend their quota. 
 External non-labour income has a negative effect on 
growth. The negative sign of reflects the fact that 
capital allocated off-farm can not be used to acquire 
quota. Another explanation can be that the increased 
household income reduces the need to increase farm 
income by growth of milk production. The fact that we 
do not find this income effect for off-farm labour 
income makes this explanation less plausible. 
Table 2 Structural growth equation estimation results 
Dependent variable: quota in kg Estimate t-ratio 
Lagged quota in kg 1.05 11.03** 
Factor inputs   
Land 0.21 3.07** 
Buildings 0.38 2.21** 
Machinery -0.11 -0.09 
Labour 0.67 2.59** 
Farm prices   
Other output price 0.32 2.40** 
Cattle price 0.45 0.15 
Quota price 0.30 2.55** 
Income    
Off-farm labour income 0.14 0.15 
External non-labour income -0.35 -1.72* 
J-test statistic  46.46 
Degrees of freedom (df)  40 
t-ratio AR(1) test  -61 
t-ratio AR(2) test  0.42 
*(**) significance at 10 per cent (5 per cent) significance level. 
V. POLICY SIMULATIONS 
In this section we compare the situation in 1999/00 
with hypothetical situations in the years 2002/2003 
resulting from the scenarios. 
A. Scenarios  
 We use equations (1), (3) and (4) in the simulations. 
If extra growth takes place extra farms have to exit 
milk production. This implies that the probability at 
which a farm exits (equation 1) goes up. We call this 
probability the cut off probability to exit. So, the cut 
off probability to exit is the probability at which 
enough farms exit to meet the extra demand for milk 
quota coming from the growth in milk production. All 
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farms with a higher probability than the cut off 
probability to exit are assumed to exit. There is also an 
influence from the exit on growth since the farms that 
exit can have a different growth potential than farms 
that stay in milk production. We define the following 
scenarios: 
 
Scenario 1: No policy change 
In the first scenario we keep all exogenous variables 
constant except age (increasing by one every year). 
This implies that milk production for all farms grows 
every year according to equation (3). We keep the 
quota price constant (which is close to the actual 
situation before the 2003 CAP reform). The quota 
price has a positive effect on growth but also on exit.  
 
Scenario 2: 2003 CAP reform 
This scenario consists of three elements: milk price 
reduction, direct income payments and a milk quota 
increase. First, we assume a milk price reduction of 10 
per cent at the end of the policy reform. Assuming that 
the marginal cost of milk production in 1999/00 is 
50% of the milk price and that it is constant over time 
leads to a 20% reduction in the quota price. A lower 
quota price decreases growth and exit. Second, we 
model decoupled direct income payments as an 
increase in external non-labour income. This leads to a 
decrease in growth (significant) and an increase in exit 
(non-significant). The decoupled direct income 
payment equals 35 Euro per ton of milk produced in 
1999/00. Finally, there is a 1.5% quota increase. A 
larger quota implies that less exit is needed to keep 
milk supply at the level of the national quota.  
 
Scenario 3: 2008 CAP Health Check 
To accommodate quota abolishment it is expected that 
in the 2008 Health Check the EU will take extra 
measures [2]. Here we assume, compared to the 2003 
CAP reform, an extra 5% milk quota increase and an 
extra 10% milk price decrease. We assume that direct 
income payments will not be increased. 
B. Results 
Table 3 shows the results of the simulations. With a 
cut off probability to exit of 0 the probability to exit is 
exactly 50%. A negative cut off probability implies a 
smaller probability to exit while with a positive cut off 




Scenario 1: No policy change 
The base scenario shows that to make milk supply 
equal to the national milk quota farms stop at a 
probability of exit less than 50%. The growth in milk 
production and the change in age (to a small extent) 
make farms to exit. In total 256 farms remain in 
production. In the sample we have 348 farms in 
1999/00, this implies that in 2002/03 we have 26.4% 
farms less, this is a drop of 6.0% per year. This 
decrease is higher than the actual decrease in the 
period 1999/00 till 2002/03 which was 16.7% or 4.0% 
per year [9]. The larger calculated exit was expected 
since we only look at specialised farms. Moreover, the 
larger decrease could come from the fact that we keep 
all other variables constant while in reality they do 
change.  
 
Scenario 2: 2003 CAP reform 
Table 3 shows that with the 2003 CAP reform exit is 
less than with the base scenario. Table 3 also shows 
how this result can be decomposed. First, a milk price 
/ quota price change does not have a large effect on 
exit and the average growth of milk production. The 
cut off probability to exit goes down slightly. So farms 
are, given a certain probability to exit, less likely to 
exit. However, the total number of farms that exit does 
not change. The negative effect on growth (so less 
farms have to exit) compensates for the positive effect 
on exit. Second, a national milk quota increase implies 
less exit resulting in a lower cut off probability to exit. 
The growth in milk production per farm does not 
change. So, the average growth of milk production per 
farm is now less than in the base scenario (14.44% 
compared to 14.58%). Third, a direct income payment 
of 35 euro per ton of milk production in 1999/00 
lowers the cut off probability to exit. Exit and growth 
remain however almost equal. The decoupled direct 
income payment has a negative effect on the growth of 
milk production (so less farm have to exit) and a 
positive effect on exit. Apparently the opposite effects 
are of the same size. However, both effects do lower 
the cut off probability to exit.  
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Table 3  The cut off probability to exit, the farms that 
remain in production and the average percentage 
growth in milk production per farm. 











Scenarios:    
S1: Base scenario -0.159 256 14.58 
S2: 2003 CAP reform -0.201 262 14.49 
S3: 2008 CAP Health 
Check 
-0.316 287 13.72 
Elements of scenarios:    
Quota price: -8.28% -0.160 256 14.58 
Quota price: -20.00% -0.162 256 14.58 
Quota price: -40.00% -0.162 256 14.58 
Total quota increase: 
1.5% 
-0.170 262 14.44 
Total quota increase: 
6.5% 
-0.286 287 13.77 
Direct income payment -0.177 256 14.58 
 
Scenario 3: 2008 CAP Health Check 
With the 2008 CAP Health Check the smallest number 
of farms exit. Especially the large quota increase and 
to a lesser extent the quota price decrease lower exit. 
Growth of milk production is the smallest in this 
scenario because the farms that do not exit in this 
scenario but do in the base scenario have a relatively 
small growth in milk production.  
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse farm growth 
and exit and its interaction in Dutch dairy farming as 
consequences of EU dairy policy reform. Results 
indicate that the decision to exit milk production is 
largely determined by household characteristics as age 
and the size of the household. This result is in line 
with e.g. Kimhi and Bollman [3] and Glauben et al. 
[9]. Variables determining profitability, e.g. milk 
price, also affect exit but to a lesser extent. Growth is 
strongly influenced by the availability of labour, 
capital and land indicating that a relatively large 
production capacity results in more growth. The policy 
reforms reduce exit. This is mainly caused by the 
quota increases. A lower milk price has little influence 
on the decision to exit where the positive effect of 
more growth is offset by the smaller probability to 
exit. Decoupled direct income payments also have 
little effect on exit. 
   The analyses in this paper are subject to some 
qualifications. First, data and estimation techniques 
did not allow taking some potentially important 
household characteristics as illness and divorce into 
account in the exit equation. Second, in the 
simulations we keep all variables except milk price, 
age, national quotas and direct income payments 
constant while these variables do change over time 
and in some cases can be affected by the policy 
changes. Despite these caveats the paper gives 
valuable insights in the causes of farm growth and 
exit, how they interact and how they are affected by 




1. Cochrane, W.W. (1958). Farm prices, myth and 
reality. University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis. 
2. Fischer Boel, M. (2007) Designing the dairy 
market for the future. Speech at the panel 
discussion on ‘Designing the dairy market for the 
future’. Brussels, 26 June. 
3. Kimhi, A. and Bollman, R. (1999) Family Farm 
Dynamics in Canada and Israel: The Case of Farm 
Exits. Agricultural Economics 21: 69-79. 
4. Weiss, C.R. (1998) Size, Growth, and Survival in 
the Upper Austrian Farm Sector. Small Business 
Economics 10: 305-312. 
5. Foltz, J.D. (2004) Entry, Exit, and Farm Size: 
Assessing an Experiment in Dairy Price Policy. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86: 
594-604. 
6. Verbeek, M. (2004) A Guide to Modern 
Econometrics 2nd Edition. Chichester: Wiley and 
sons, p. 190-194. 
7. Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991) Some Tests of 
Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and an Application to Employment 
Equations. Review of Economic Studies 58: 277-
279. 
8. CBS/LEI (2000 and 2006) Land- en 
tuinbouwcijfers. The Hague/Voorburg. 
9. Glauben, T., Tietje, H. and Weiss, C.R. (2004) 
Intergenerational Succession in Farm Households: 
Evidence from Upper Austria. Review of 
Economics of the Household: 443-462. 
 
 6 
Appendix A  DATA 
Table A1 Data for average specialized dairy farm in the Netherlands in 1999/00 
Variable Unit Mean Standard 
deviation 
Quota 1000 kg 472.59 286.01 
Cowsa Number 54.12 30.58 
Land Hectares 326 19.82 
Buildings 1000 Euro of 1999 198.48 110.52 
Machinery 1000 Euro of 1999 81.95 54.55 
On-farm labour Hours 4068 1484 
Milk price index 1991 = 1 0.92  
Other output price index 1991 = 1 0.90  
Input price index 1991 = 1 0.92  
Cattle price index 1991 = 1 0.87  
Quota price index 1991 = 1 1.07  
Sheepa b Number 186 49.22 
Pigsa c Number 50.62 159.36 
Meat cattlea d Number 3.37 13.53 
Arable cropsa e Hectares 6.11 8.08 
Off-farm labour incomea f  1000 Euro 09 7.77 
External non-labour 
income  
1000 Euro 10.29 8.82 
Off-farm wage index 1991 = 1 1.24  
Household members Number 4.65 1.91 
Education Discrete variable 2.45 0.60 
Age Years 49.61 10.670 
 
